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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Derek Edward Moad appeals from the judgment of conviction imposed 
upon the jury's verdicts finding him guilty of rape, battery with the intent to 
commit rape or the infamous crime against nature, and misdemeanor battery. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Moad was incarcerated at the Idaho Correctional Center where he shared 
a cell with L.T. (Tr.1, p.145, L.13 - p.147, L.17.) A communication placed in an 
inmate concern box and letters discovered upon a subsequent search of Moad's 
and L.T.'s cell prompted prison officials to interview Moad and L.T. about an 
altercation. (Tr., p. 103, L.16 - p.106, L.12; p.116, L.13 - p.121, L.15.) 
Moad and L.T. both told investigators that Moad sexually battered L.T. on 
approximately June 8 and 10, 2011. (State's exhibits 2, 4; Tr., p.121, L.12-
p.129, L.25.) On June 8, near their cell door, Moad struck L.T. with his fists, 
knees, head, and elbows, choked him with his forearm, and pushed him to his 
knees. (State's exhibits 2,4; Tr., p.123, Ls.11-20; p.155, L.17 - p.156, L.18.) 
Moad then forced L.T. to perform oral sex on him. (State's exhibits 2, 4; Tr., 
p.123, Ls.21-22; p.156, L.11 - p.157, L.21.) Following this, Moad told L.T. to 
move to the bottom bunk in the cell, where he placed L.T. face down, pulled his 
pants down, applied lotion to his penis, and rubbed his erect penis in L.T.'s 
buttocks area. (Tr., p.124, Ls.7-18; p.158, LA - p.161, L.11.) On June 10, Moad 
1 In its Respondent's brief, the state cites only to the transcript that contains the 
jury trial and sentencing hearing. The state refers to this transcript as "Tr." 
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again struck L.T. in the face several times with his fists, elbow and head, and 
also hit L.T. in the face several times with his erect penis. (State's exhibits 2, 4; 
Tr., p.162, L.13-p.165, L.11.) 
A grand jury indicted Moad for rape (Count I) and battery with the intent to 
commit rape or the infamous crime against nature (Count II) for his June 8 
attacks on L.T. (R., pp.12-14.) The grand jury also indicted Moad on a separate 
count of battery with the intent to commit rape or the infamous crime against 
nature (Count III) for his June 10 attack. (Id.) After a trial, the jury found Moad 
guilty as charged on both Counts I and II. (R., pp.123-124.) The jury acquitted 
Moad as charged on Count III, but convicted him of the lesser included offense of 
misdemeanor battery. (R., pp.125-126.) 
The district court imposed a unified life sentence with 10 years fixed for 
rape, a concurrent indeterminate 10-year sentence for battery with intent to 
commit rape or the infamous crime against nature, and a concurrent 6 month jail 
term for misdemeanor battery. (R., pp.136-138.) Moad timely appealed. (R., 
pp.140-143.) 
2 
ISSUES 
Moad states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the punishment for both Counts I and " violated Mr. 
Moad's constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. 
2. Whether there was insufficient evidence to support the guilty 
verdict against Mr. Moad for battery with the intent to commit 
rape or the infamous crime against nature. 
(Appellant's brief, pA) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Did Moad fail to preserve his claim that the district court's sentence 
violates double jeopardy? 
2. Has Moad failed to demonstrate fundamental error in the jury instructions? 
3. Has Moad failed to demonstrate that the evidence presented was 
insufficient to support his conviction for battery with the intent to commit 
rape? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Moad Has Failed To Preserve His Claim That The District Court's Sentence 
Violates Double Jeopardy 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Moad contends that his right against double 
punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions was violated because he was punished for both rape and battery 
with intent to commit rape or the infamous crime against nature. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.5-18.) Specifically, he contends that he was punished twice for a single, 
continuing criminal attack on L.T. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-11.) Moad's claim fails 
because he failed to preserve his argument that the district court imposed an 
illegal sentence. Even if Moad had preserved this claim, his contention fails 
because his rape of L.T. near the prison cell door was a separate and distinct 
criminal act from his subsequent attack on L.T. on the cell bunk bed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a defendant's prosecution complies with the constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review. 
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58,63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2000). 
C. Moad Has Failed To Preserve His Claim That The District Court's 
Sentence Violates Double Jeopardy 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be 
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twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. This clause protects 
a defendant against multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. Schiro 
v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994); State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 622, 38 
P.3d 1275, 1278 (Ct. App. 2001). 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 allows the trial court to correct a sentence that is 
illegal from the face of the record at any time, on the motion of either party, and 
either party may appeal from the trial court's ruling. I.C.R. 35; State v. 
Hernandez, 122 Idaho 227,229, 832 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Ct. App. 1992). A double 
jeopardy claim asserting that a court imposed multiple punishments for the same 
offense clearly presents a challenge to the legality of a particular sentence which 
may be addressed pursuant to I.C.R. 35. State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 
841,291 P.3d 1036, 1040 (2013) (Ua double jeopardy claim may properly be 
brought in a [I.C.R. 35"] motion."); see also State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733,745, 
69 P.3d 153, 165 (Ct. App. 2003) ("An illegal sentence ... is one in excess of a 
statutory provision or otherwise contrary to applicable law."); State v. Pratt, 125 
Idaho 546, 553-560, 873 P.2d 800, 807-815 (1993) (double jeopardy claim 
analyzed pursuant to Pratt's I.C.R. 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence 
presented to the district court); State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944 n.2, 71 P.3d 
1088, 1091 n.2 (Ct. App. 2003) (a double jeopardy challenge may be raised "by a 
motion under I.C.R. 35 to correct an illegal sentence"). Further, a claim of an 
illegal sentence may not be raised for the first time on appeal without the trial 
court having first had an opportunity to consider the legality of the terms of the 
sentence. State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 845, 828 P.2d 871, 874 (1992) (court 
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declined to consider claim of illegal sentence because defendant presented it for 
first time on appeal, notwithstanding the fact that the record clearly demonstrated 
that sentence was illegal); State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 578-79, 808 P.2d 
1322,1323-24 (1991). 
There is no indication in the record that Moad challenged the legality of his 
sentence to the district court by way of an I.C.R. 35 motion,2 or by any other 
means. He thereby deprived the district court of the opportunity to correct any 
alleged error. Therefore, Moad failed to preserve the issue for appellate review, 
and this Court must decline to address it absent a showing of fundamental error. 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010) (re-articulating 
Idaho fundamental error review standard) 
In this case however, no fundamental error review is necessary because 
the policies implicated by the fundamental error doctrine are simply not present. 
Most trial errors must be objected to before the district court and raised on direct 
appeal or a criminal defendant forfeits his opportunity to challenge the alleged 
error. The doctrine of fundamental error affords a defendant the right to 
appellate review that would otherwise not exist. However, I.C.R. 35 specifically 
provides an avenue for pursuing relief from an allegedly illegal sentence at any 
2 According to the Idaho Repository, Moad filed an I.C.R. 35 motion on 
November 23, 2012, after the clerk's record was lodged in this case. The district 
court denied that motion on December 18, 2012. Neither Moad's I.C.R. 35 
motion, nor the district court's order denying it, are a part of the appellate record. 
Further, Moad did not reference this motion in his Appellant's brief. Therefore, it 
is unclear whether Moad utilized I.C.R. 35 merely to request leniency and a 
reduced sentence, or whether he raised a double jeopardy challenge to his 
sentence. 
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time, so if this Court declined to consider the issue, Moad would not be precluded 
from having his double jeopardy claim considered by the district court. 
Consistent with these policies, Idaho appellate courts have declined to perform 
fundamental error analysis where a defendant raises an illegal sentence claim for 
the first time on appeal. Lavy, 121 Idaho at 845, 828 P.2d at 874; Martin, 119 
Idaho at 578-79, 808 P.2d at 1323-24; State v. Dorsey, 126 Idaho 659, 662, 889 
P.2d 93, 96 (Ct. App. 1995); Hernandez, 122 Idaho at 229; 832 P.2d at 1164. 
The district court must be given an opportunity to correct its alleged errors, after 
which Moad may appeal if he is not satisfied with the district court's decision. 
Because Moad failed to raise his double jeopardy claim below, and could 
still raise it as an illegal sentence claim pursuant to LC.R. 35, this Court must 
decline to consider this issue for the first time on appeal. 
D. Even If This Court Analyzes Moad's Double Jeopardy Claim For 
Fundamental Error, Moad Has Failed To Establish Such Error 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeaL" 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Absent a 
timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error 
under the fundamental error doctrine. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d 961 at 
979. Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Moad to demonstrate 
the error he alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional 
rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not 
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure 
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to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." k!,., at 228, 245 
P.3d at 980. 
In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (2011), the United 
States Supreme Court set forth the applicable test for double jeopardy as follows: 
[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two 
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine 
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each 
provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Under the "pleading theory" occasionally utilized by the Idaho appellate 
courts, a lesser included offense is one "alleged in the information as a means or 
element of the commission of the higher offense." State v. Anderson, 82 Idaho 
293,301,352 P.2d 972, 977 (1960); McKinney, 153 Idaho at 841,291 P.3d at 
1040; see also State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368,374,256 P.3d 776, 782 (Ct. App. 
2011 ). 
By its very terms, application of the Blockburger test for double jeopardy is 
conditioned on there being multiple offenses which stem from the "same act or 
transaction." Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. If, however, multiple charges are 
based on different acts, double jeopardy protections cannot be violated and 
neither the Blockburger test, nor the pleading theory have any application. See 
State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22,33-34,951 P.2d 1249, 1260-1261 (1997) (analyzing 
whether Bush committed two distinct criminal offenses for which he could be 
punished separately, rather than utilizing the Blockburger or pleading theory tests 
to determine whether the charged conduct constituted the "same crime" for 
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double jeopardy purposes); see also People v. Siewkiewicz, 802 N.E.2d 767, 
771 (III. 2003) ("Prior to applying the Blockburger test, we must decide whether 
defendant's reckless homicide prosecution is based on a different act than his 
reckless driving conviction"); Vick v. State, 991 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1999) ("Because the offenses at issue involve separate acts, we need not 
determine whether those offenses would be considered the 'same' under the 
Blockburger test because the precondition for employing the test (that the two 
offenses involve the same conduct) is absent"). 
While battery with the intent to commit rape is a lesser included offense of 
forcible rape under the Blockburger test, see State v. Bolton, 119 Idaho 846, 848-
850, 810 P.2d 1132, 1134-1136 (Ct. App. 1991), in this case, there was no 
double jeopardy violation because Moad's oral rape of L.T. near the prison cell 
door was a separate and distinct criminal act from his subsequent sexual battery 
of L.T. that took place on the cell bunk. 
In State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410,414,725 P.2d 115, 119 (1986), the 
Idaho Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a course of criminal 
conduct constitutes one offense or several. The Court held that it depends on 
"whether or not the conduct constituted separate, distinct and independent 
crimes." !9.,.; see also Bush, 131 Idaho at 33-34,951 P.2d at 1260-1261 (1997). 
This determination further requires an inquiry into the "circumstances of the 
conduct" and consideration of the "intent and objective of the actor." Major, 111 
Idaho at414, 725 P.3d at 119. 
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In Bush, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically addressed whether two 
acts of sexual assault constituted one continuous crime or separate distinct 
crimes. Bush, 131 Idaho at 33-34,951 P.2d at 1260-1261. The Court held that 
Bush committed two distinct criminal offenses when he first battered the victim on 
his bed; and then pulled the victim off of the bed and moved him to a couch, 
where he tied the victim's arms behind his back with a cord, and then committed 
a second sexual battery. lsi 
Similarly, in this case, Moad's rape and subsequent battery of L.T. were 
separate and distinct by time, and by location within the prison cell. Moad also 
formulated separate criminal intents in carrying out each of the two acts. Moad 
forcibly raped L.T. near the prison cell door by striking him and forcing him to 
perform oral sex. (State's exhibits 2, 4; Tr., p.123, Ls.11-20; p.155, L.17 - p.157, 
L.21.) The crime of rape was completed at this point. As in Bush, several events 
and a passage of time then occurred prior to Moad's second attack. Moad 
ordered L.T. to a different part of the prison cell, the bottom bunk, where Moad 
pulled L.T.'s pants down and applied lotion to his own penis. (Tr., p.124, Ls.7-18; 
p.158, L.4 - p.161, L.11.) Then, Moad rubbed his erect penis on L.T.'s buttocks. 
(Id.) This attack on the bottom cell bunk constituted a new and separate criminal 
act, and involved Moad's new and separate intent to rape L.T. a second time. 
Moad's completed rape of L.T. near the cell door was a separate and 
distinct criminal act from his subsequent battery of L.T with the intent to commit 
rape or the infamous crime against nature on the cell bunk bed. The Double 
Jeopardy clauses of the United States and Idaho constitutions did not preclude 
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Moad's convictions and punishments for these two separate crimes. Moad has 
therefore failed to establish any constitutional error with regard to this claim, let 
alone plain error and prejudice that would warrant a reversal of his conviction 
under the Perry fundamental error test. 
II. 
Moad Has Failed To Demonstrate Fundamental Error In The Jury Instructions 
A. Introduction 
Moad contends the jury instructions violated his constitutional rights 
because they permitted the jury to find he was guilty of battery with intent to 
commit rape or the infamous crime against nature based on conduct that 
occurred immediately prior to his oral rape of L.T. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-18.) 
This prior conduct, Moad asserts, constituted the same act as the oral rape, and 
therefore, punishment for both the rape and the pre-rape battery would violate his 
double jeopardy rights. (ld.) Moad is precluded from raising this issue on appeal 
due to the doctrine of invited error. Alternatively, Moad has failed to establish 
fundamental error in the jury instructions. 
B. The Jury Instructions Fairly And Accurately Reflected The Applicable Law 
When reviewing jury instructions, the appellate court asks whether the 
instructions as a whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect 
applicable law. State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 942, 866 P.2d 193, 199 (Ct. 
App. 1993). 
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As discussed above, "[I]n cases of unobjected to fundamental error: (1) 
the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or obvious, without 
the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, 
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision; 
and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's 
substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the 
outcome of the trial proceedings." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P .3d at 978. 
In this case, with regard to the attacks of June 8, the indictment alleged 
that Moad committed rape by "us[ing] his penis to penetrate the oral opening of 
[L.T.], a male person, which was done for the purpose of sexual arousal, 
gratification, or abuse, and where [L.T.] was prevented from resistance by threats 
of immediate and great bodily harm accompanied by the apparent power of 
execution, to wit: by physically beating and choking [L.T.]." (R., pp.12-13.) The 
indictment also alleged that Moad committed battery with the intent to commit 
rape or the infamous crime against nature on or about June 8th by "willfully and 
unlawfully us[ing] force or violence upon the person of [L.T.] by punching, 
elbowing, kneeing and/or kicking [L.T.] multiple times, with the intent to commit 
rape and/or the infamous crime of nature." (Id.) The corresponding jury 
instruction on these two charges substantially tracked the indictment. (R., 
pp.109-110). 
The facts adduced at trial showed that Moad battered L.T. twice - once 
before forcing him to perform oral sex on him near the cell door, and then again 
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after ordering L.T. to move to the cell bunk. (See generally Tr.) Moad's initial, 
pre-rape battery of L.T. was one of the elements of the charged rape. (R., pp.12-
13.) For the first time on appeal, Moad contends that the jury instructions were 
flawed because they permitted the jury to convict him of battery with the intent to 
commit rape or the infamous crime against nature for either of the two instances 
of battery, and that a conviction for the initial battery would result in 
unconstitutional multiple punishments for the same conduct. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.15-18.) Moad's claim is precluded by the invited error doctrine, and in any 
event, Moad has failed to establish fundamental error. 
1. Moad's Claim Of Error Is Barred By The Invited Error Doctrine 
"The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an 
error when his or her own conduct induces the commission of the error." State v. 
Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 187, 254 P.3d 77, 88 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. 
Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993)). The purpose 
of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who "caused or played an 
important role in prompting a trial court" to take a particular action from "later 
challenging that decision on appeal." State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 
P.2d 117, 120 (1999). "One may not complain of errors one has consented to or 
acquiesced in." Norton, 151 Idaho at 187, 254 P.3d at 88 (citing State v. Caudill, 
109 Idaho 222,226,706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985); State v. Lee, 131 Idaho 600,605, 
961 P.2d 1203, 1208 (Ct. App. 1998)). 
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In this case, while Moad raised the potential instructional issue prior to the 
jury's deliberations, he did not object to the indictment or instructions. (Tr., 
p.203, L.9 - p.205, L.11.) Instead, Moad told the court that he did not know 
whether the potential confusion could be better addressed by an additional jury 
instruction, or during closing argument. (Tr., p.203, Ls.9-21.) The district court 
responded that the jury instructions properly stated the elements of the charge, 
and that any potential confusion could be addressed at closing argument. (Tr., 
p.205, Ls.2-10.) Moad replied, "fair enough." (Tr., p.205, Ls.2-10.) 
By suggesting to the court that any potential confusion in the jury 
instructions could be alleviated at closing argument, and by consenting and 
acquiescing to the district court's suggestion to pursue that course, Moad invited 
any error related to such potential confusion. Moad is therefore precluded from 
raising this issue on appeal. 
2. Moad Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error With Regard To 
His Claim of Instructional Error 
Even if this Court chooses not to apply the invited error doctrine, Moad's 
claim of error is still precluded because he has failed to establish fundamental 
error under Perry. Specifically, he has failed to establish either plain error or 
prejudice. 
As suggested by Moad himself and by the district court, Moad had and 
took the opportunity to address any potential confusion regarding the jury 
instructions during his closing argument. During closing argument, Moad's 
counsel specifically informed the jury that "the conduct in Count 1\ is not any 
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batteries or any alleged attacks before the oral sex incident. It comes from the 
battery related to the [subsequent] buttocks incident." (Tr., p.249, Ls.14-18.) 
Moad's counsel went on to argue that the state failed to prove that Moad's post-
rape battery was accompanied by the requisite intent to rape because this 
second attack did not result in penetration of any kind, and because several prior 
altercations between Moad and L.T. did not result in sexual interactions. (Tr., 
p.250, L.3 - p. 253, L.3.) In its own closing argument, the state also discussed 
the acts charged in Count II as occurring after the oral rape. (Tr., p.238, Ls.20 -
24) ("And in Count II, we pick up the story after the oral rape. Mr. Moad wasn't 
done. He pushed [L.T.] and instructed him to go to his bunk and lay face down. 
This is where the attack continued or a new attack starts.") Both Moad and the 
state thus presented the case to the jury as consisting of two separate alleged 
attacks, one occurring near the cell door, and the other occurring on the bottom 
cell bunk. Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury that "Each count charges 
a separate and distinct offense." (R., p.1 05.) 
While the jury instruction and facts adduced at trial created the theoretical 
possibility that the jury could have found Moad guilty of battery with intent to 
commit rape based on the pre-rape battery that was an element of the rape 
charge, Moad cannot demonstrate that the jury actually did so in light of the 
nature of the parties' closing arguments, the jury instructions (to which he did not 
object), and the evidence presented. Instead, it is exceedingly more likely that 
the jury analyzed the case the way it was framed to them by both parties and the 
trial court's instructions - as two separate alleged batteries occurring on or about 
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June 8, one occurring near the cell door, and the occurring on the cell bunk bed. 
Moad therefore has failed to meet his burden under Perry to demonstrate plain 
constitutional error in the context of the available record. 
For the same reasons, Moad has also failed to meet the third prong of the 
Perry fundamental error analysis, because he has failed to demonstrate that he 
was prejudiced by any error. He cannot show that the jury actually acted in such 
a way as to deprive him of his constitutional rights. 
Because Moad has failed to establish fundamental error, this Court must 
affirm his conviction for battery with intent to commit rape or the infamous crime 
against nature. 
C. Even If Moad Has Demonstrated Fundamental Error With Regard To His 
Claims, He Is Entitled Only To A Reversal Of His Conviction For Battery 
With Intent To Commit Rape Or The Infamous Crime Against Nature 
Moad has requested that this court vacate his convictions for rape, and 
battery with the intent to commit rape or the infamous crime against nature. 
(Appellant's brief, p.20.) Even if Moad had demonstrated fundamental error with 
regard to his double jeopardy or instructional error claims, his remedy would be 
limited to a reversal of his conviction and sentence for battery with the intent to 
commit rape or the infamous crime against nature. See State v. Eby, 136 Idaho 
534, 540, 37 P.3d 625, 631 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that defendant's conviction 
and sentence for attempted robbery should have been vacated and merged into 
his conviction and sentence for felony murder, upon the jury's verdicts of guilty to 
both counts); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 756-758, 810 P.2d 680, 694-696 
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(1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,432, 825 
P.2d 1081, 1088 (1991); see also Williams v. Singletary, 78 F.3d 1510, 1516-
1517 (11th Cir. 1996) (After determining that the trial court violated double 
jeopardy by cumulatively sentencing the defendant for burglary and the lesser 
included offense of assault, holding that the defendant was not entitled to the 
"windfall" of dismissal of the greater burglary count, but only the vacating of the 
lesser-included assault charge.) 
If this Court does consider Moad's unpreserved double jeopardy and jury 
instruction claims, and concludes that Moad is entitled to relief, it should vacate 
only his conviction and sentence for battery with intent to commit rape or the 
infamous crime against nature, and remand the case to the district court. 
III. 
Moad Has Failed To Show That The Evidence Presented Was Insufficient To 
Support His Conviction For Battery With Intent To Commit Rape 
A. Introduction 
Moad contends that the state presented insufficient evidence to support 
his conviction for battery with intent to commit rape or the infamous crime against 
nature. (Appellant's brief, pp.18-20.) Specifically, Moad contends that the 
evidence failed to demonstrate that he possessed the requisite intent to rape L.T. 
a second time while he battered him on the prison cell bed. (Id.) Moad's 
argument fails because the positioning of L.T. face down on the bed, and Moad's 
acts of pulling L.T.'s pants down, lubricating his own penis with lotion, and 
rubbing his erect penis on Moad's buttocks area constitute substantial evidence 
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from which a rational jury could conclude that Moad possessed the requisite 
intent to rape L.T. at the time he battered him. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); 
State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570,826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hart, 112 
Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting this review 
the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the 
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P .2d at 
607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 
Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn 
from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. Miller, 
131 Idaho at 292, 955 P .2d at 607; Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P .2d at 1072 
C. The Evidence Presented Was Sufficient To Support Moad's Conviction For 
Battery With Intent To Commit Rape 
A conviction pursuant to I.C. § 18-911 as alleged in Count II in this case 
required the state to prove that Moad battered L.T. with the intent to commit rape 
or the infamous crime against nature. (R., pp.12-14, 110.) The state met its 
burden of proving Moad guilty of this offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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The evidence in this case demonstrated that Moad ordered LT. to go to 
the lower bunk in the prison cell, where Moad pulled L.T.'s pants down, applied 
lotion to his own penis, and rubbed his penis on Moad's buttocks area. (Tr., 
p.124, Ls.7-18; p.158, LA - p.161, L.11.) After LT. asked Moad to stop, Moad 
eventually ceased the attack. (Tr., p.159, L.20 - p.160, L.9.) 
On appeal, Moad contends that his sudden cessation of his attack 
demonstrated that he lacked the intent to rape LT. (Appellant's brief, pp.18-20.) 
Moad argues that evidence that previous physical altercations between himself 
and LT. also ended only when Moad chose to end them demonstrated that if 
Moad possessed any intent to rape L.T., he would have. (Id.) This defense 
theory however, while proper for closing argument, does not establish that the 
evidence was insufficient. A rational jury could infer that Moad struck L.T., pulled 
L.T.'s pants down, lubricated his own penis with lotion, and then rubbed L.T.'s 
buttocks area with his penis as a prelude to an intended rape, but that he then 
simply changed his mind and declined to complete the act. Moad may have 
declined to carry out the rape out of sympathy, guilt, fatigue, fear of getting 
caught, or some other reason. The state was not required to prove that Moad 
declined to rape LT. a second time for any particular reason, only that Moad 
possessed the requisite intent as the battery was occurring. The state presented 
sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude the state met that burden. 
Moad has failed to show otherwise. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Moad's convictions 
rape, battery with intent to commit rape or the infamous crime against nature, 
and misdemeanor battery. 
DATED this 13th day of August, 2013. 
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